IN
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF
APPELLATE DIVISION
Appeal
No.0604476CFAWS
Case
No: 056054DVRTWA
VINCENT LEE RADY,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF
Appellee.
___________________________/
Ryan Thomas Truskoski,
Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
Devin Jones, Esq.,
A.S.A.
Attorney for Appelee
ORDER
AND OPINION
The appellant plead no
contest and was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in
violation of Florida Statute 316.193. On
June 23, 2006, a restitution hearing was held.
The trial court entered its order setting restitution in the amount of
$2150.00, half of the requested restitution. The appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal. After reviewing the
briefs and record, this Court reverses the trial court’s decision.
Appellant, Rady, and the alleged
victim, St. Valley, were in a car accident. After investigation, the appellant
was issued a citation for DUI which included property damage in the amount of
$4000.00. The victim, Patricia St. Valley, received a citation for failure
to yield to right of way. Appellant plead no contest and was
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of F.S.
316.193.
At the
restitution hearing, St. Valley testified that she hit her head in the accident
and had a horrible headache along with some spasms, which she had before the
accident from a previous injury. St. Valley admitted that she was the cause of
the car accident.
After
testimony, the defense argued that restitution should be denied because the state
failed to prove a relationship between the amount of restitution and the
defendant’s actions. The defense also argued that restitution should be denied
because the defendant was not charged with DUI property damage. However,
the state responded that appellant’s traffic citation stated `property damage
in the amount of $4000.00.’ Finally, the
defense argued that according to the police report and citation, St. Valley was
the party at fault; adding that the appellant had a stroke and his car was
totaled as a result of this accident. The
trial entered its order setting restitution in the amount of $2150.00, 50% of
the requested institution..
In
dealing with the issue of restitution, the Supreme Court of Florida has stated
the following:
This Court, . . . allowed restitution in a case
where there was a significant relationship between the damages and the offense.
. . .This significant relationship test does not replace the causal
relationship required by section 775.098(1)(a). Rather, we believe that the
significant relationship test . . . should work in conjunction with the
causation required by the statute.
State v. Williams, 520
So. 2d 276, 277. (
Williams case,
the Second District Court of Appeal, in Arling v. State, 559 So. 2d 1274,
1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) stated the following:
We believe the causation required between the offense and the
damage under Williams is
similar, if not identical, to the proximate causation required in tort between
a tortious act and the resulting damage. See
Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Civ.) 5.1. Thus, the victim should be entitled to recover
damages through criminal restitution if the causal connection between the
criminal offense and the damage is comparable to that proximate causation which
would allow the victim to relate comparable damages to a wrongful act in tort.
In Watson v. State, 579
So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), the court commented on O’Steen v. State,
547 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) as follows:
. . . the Court applied a two pronged test to
determine whether restitution could be awarded: (1) was the damage or loss for
which restitution is ordered caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s
offense, (2) was there a significant relationship between the damage to the
victim and the crime proved.
With the general tests having now been set forth, the closest
case to the present situation appears to be Stewart v. State,
571 So.2d 485 (
Restitution may be
imposed only for damages that are caused directly or indirectly by a
defendant’s offense…There must be a significant relationship between the
damages and the offense . . . The significant relationship test works in
conjunction with the causation required by statute.
Applying the above to
the facts herein, it is apparent that the suspension of the petitioner’s
license was an existing condition, not the cause of the accident. Because the driving with a suspended license
was not the cause of the accident, it had no relationship to the damages
suffered by the other driver.
In Schuette
v. State, 822 So. 2d 1275 (
Based
on the foregoing principles and the facts of this case, this Court finds that
the fact that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, while certainly an
existing condition or status, was not the cause of the accident. St. Valley
admitted that the accident was her fault and she was cited for failure to yield
the right of way. In short, the cause of
the accident was the other driver’s failure to yield the right of way and not
the defendant’s intoxication. Driving
under the influence alone is insufficient to impose restitution. The State
simply failed to sustain its burden of proving causation by a preponderance of
the evidence. It is, therefore,
ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that the decision of the trial court is REVERSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in
Chambers at New Port Richey,
________________________
Primary
Appellate Judge
__________________
Daniel
D. Diskey
Circuit
Judge
______________________
Circuit
Judge
Copies to:
Ryan Thomas Truskoski, Esq.
Devin Jones, Esq., A.S.A.
Honorable Marc Salton
County Court Judges/